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From the University Presses — What Is
Educational Fair Use?
Column Editor: Sanford G. Thatcher (Director, Penn State Press, USB 1, Suite C, 820 N. University Drive, University Park,
PA 16802-1003; Phone: 814-865-1327; Fax: 814-863-1408) <sgt3@psu.edu> www.psupress.org
In December 2007 the ARL released a
white paper titled Educational Fair Use Today
by Jonathan Band, a well-known lawyer
based in Washington, DC, who specializes in
intellectual property issues related to technology law and policy. In its press release accompanying the posting of the paper at the ARL’s
Website (http://www.arl.org/news/pr/ed-fairuse-12dec07.shtml), the ARL presented the
value of the paper in this way: “Band discusses
three recent appellate decisions concerning fair
use that should give educators and librarians
greater confidence and guidance for asserting
this important privilege.” I would like to suggest that educators and librarians are ill advised
to use this paper as a basis for such “greater
confidence.”
The paper analyzes three recent appellate
court decisions, one in the Ninth Circuit and
two in the Second Circuit. With Band’s analysis of the two latter cases, Blanch v. Koons and
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley,
I have no argument. These are what might be
regarded as classic fair-use cases fully in conformity with the long tradition of jurisprudence
in this area. If there is anything controversial
at all about the second of these two cases, it
would be that the seven images of posters about the Grateful Dead owned by
the Archives and included in the book
published by DK were reproduced
in their entirety, albeit in reduced
size. But I don’t think there are
any copyright experts today who
would argue that use of an entire
work, especially an image, would
automatically not be fair if used
in a “transformative” way. So
comfortable do most attorneys feel
about such use these days that the
counsel for Penn State are allowing our press to publish a book on
the philosophy of black film using
35 film stills without permission
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from the rightsholders on the grounds that
their use for purposes of scholarly comment
and criticism in our book is exactly what fair
use has traditionally been meant to allow.
University presses have perhaps been too timid
in the past about testing the limits of fair use,
shackled as they usually are by the risk-averse
attitudes of university attorneys, but core uses
like this are so clear-cut that the risks seem
very minimal indeed.
The other case, Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com,
decided in the Ninth Circuit is quite different
and readily distinguishable from the Second
Circuit cases in a way that Band obfuscates by
emphasizing instead that, “in all three cases, the
courts found commercial uses to be fair.” True,
but it has been firmly established at least since
the Supreme Court decided the landmark fairuse case of Campbell v. Acuff Rose in 1994
that the commercial nature of the use can be
trumped by the “transformative” purpose of the
use. This is what allows commercial publishers
to rely on fair use just as nonprofit presses do,
when they are publishing books and journals
that quote passages or reproduce images from
previous works in the process of advancing
scholarship, the paradigmatic application of
fair use that is undergirded by the Constitutional language of Article 1, which affirms
the purpose of copyright protection to
be “promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts” or, in the
words of the first U.S. Copyright
Act of 1790, “the encouragement
of learning.”
Before pointing to what importantly distinguishes the Ninth
Circuit from the Second Circuit
decisions, it may be useful to say a
word about the differences between
these two circuits themselves. The
Second Circuit has long been
regarded as the premier circuit
for the adjudication of copyright
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cases. Such landmark cases as Texaco and
Kinko’s were decided in the Second Circuit,
for example, and the Google case is currently
in progress there. One reason, of course, is
that the publishing industry in the U.S. is
heavily concentrated in New York City, and it
is therefore no accident that so many copyright
cases end up in this Circuit. Another reason
is that the Second Circuit boasts probably
the leading expert in copyright law in Judge
Pierre Leval, long a district court judge (as
he was in presiding over the Texaco case) but
now a member of the Court of Appeals there.
Leval is the author of what is perhaps the most
widely cited article on fair use, “Toward a Fair
Use Standard”, Harvard Law Review (March
1990). In it he argues strongly for the proposition that “transformative” use is “the soul
of fair use.” The Supreme Court’s ruling in
Campbell embodies the spirit of Leval’s argument as it viewed “transformative” use as the
decisive element in weighing the four factors
in this case involving a parody. So, too, do
the two rulings in the Second Circuit cited
by Band in his white paper, not surprisingly
because Judge Leval sits on the appeals court
that decided these cases!
The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, has been
out on a limb in many ways in this area of
jurisprudence, espousing theories that have
no support in other circuits and little support
among academic experts either. A good example is an extension of the Perfect 10 case,
Perfect 10 v. Visa International, which is now
on appeal to the Supreme Court. In this case,
Perfect 10 is seeking to hold Visa and Master
Card liable for vicarious and contributory
infringement because they service offshore
businesses that are known by these credit
card companies to be illegally reproducing
and selling images copyrighted by Perfect
10. The question presented on appeal is this:
“Did the Ninth Circuit err in holding, contrary
to long-established principles of secondary
copyright liability, that financial institutions
and credit card companies cannot be liable, as
a matter of law, for the services they provide
to Websites that traffic in stolen copyrighted
works, even if they know the Websites are
engaged in massive infringement, they profit
from each infringing transaction, they have
both the contractual right and the practical ability to stop or limit the infringing activity, and
the infringing Websites cannot viably function
without the services these companies provide?”
In a sharp dissent commenting on the tortured
reasoning his colleagues used to arrive at their
decision, Judge Kozinski wrote that the court
has made “very new — and very bad — law,”
which “conflicts with every material assistance
case that I know of” and “will prove to be no
end of trouble.” He added: “If such active
participation in infringing conduct does not
continued on page 63
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amount to indirect infringement, it’s hard to
imagine what would.” Driving the majority’s
determination to reach the conclusion it did was
a dubious theory of what public policy requires:
“1. to promote the continued development of
the Internet and other interactive media [and]
2. to preserve the vibrant and competitive free
market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services, unfettered
by Federal or State regulation.” Apart from the
fact that it is the function of the legislature, not
the judiciary, to decide what U.S. public policy
is, the flaw of this analysis was succinctly
noted by Judge Kozinski: “there is no policy
of the United States to encourage electronic
commerce in stolen goods, illegal drugs, or
child pornography.”
This case alone should make people wary
of relying on Ninth Circuit decisions as solid
ground for inferring what copyright law is.
But it might be noted, too, that the Supreme
Court in a unanimous decision in June 2005
overturned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision of a year earlier finding in favor
of Grokster, which of course went out of existence after the Supreme Court ruling in the
face of multiple infringement suits. Band asks
us to trust the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in the
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com rulings. Considered
within this broader context, however, there is
every reason to be suspicious of how this court
arrives at its decisions. In fact, it offers a perfect example of what Georgia Harper argues
to be the norm for deciding fair-use cases in her
article “Google This!” (http://www.utsystem.
edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/googlethis.htm).
Building on an earlier analysis by Wendy
Gordon, Harper shows that, at least in the
more controversial cases where precedents may
not be directly or clearly relevant, judges will
ordinarily reach their conclusions about fair
use on the basis of their own understanding
of what is most socially beneficial and then,
conforming to the requirements of legal procedure, explain their decisions in terms of the
four-factor analysis. It is quite obvious in the
Perfect 10 v. Visa case that the Ninth Circuit
exactly followed this procedure, deciding first
what “public policy” demands and then interpreting the law of vicarious and contributory
liability accordingly. I would submit that the
court did exactly the same in Perfect 10 v.
Amazon.com. Because of its strong bias in
favor of promoting the Internet as a crucial tool
of “free market” commerce, the court here decided that the functionality of Google’s search
engine entitles it to exalted status as a socially
beneficial instrumentality. As Mr. Band says,
“In fact, the court went so far as to say that ‘a
search engine may be more transformative
than a parody,’ the quintessential fair use,
‘because a search engine provides an entirely
new use for the original work, while a parody
typically has the same entertainment purpose
as the original work.” I submit that this is
fundamentally flawed reasoning that it would
be dangerous for any educational institution
to take as gospel.
In a sense, of course, the Constitutional
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purpose as expressed in Article 1 makes the
utilitarian nature of copyright law clear enough:
creators are given a limited monopoly over their
copyrighted works for the sake of advancing
learning. But traditionally what fair use has
meant as a crucial part of copyright is a means of
making sure that the monopoly does not extend
too far and thereby hinder the creativity of others
who wish to build on past work, adding value to
it by embedding it in new work in the context
of comment and criticism. Until Congress
passed the 1976 Copyright Act, fair use never
justified the sheer duplication of copies of the
original as a substitute for it. Section 107 does,
of course, contain a reference to the making
of “multiple copies” for classroom use as an
example of copying that might be considered
fair use under certain circumstances. Congress
claimed not to be changing the interpretation
of fair use as already undertaken in the courts,
but in this and some other respects, as Kenny
Crews notes in his book Copyright, Fair Use,
and the Challenge for Universities (Chicago,
1993), “despite its denials, Congress was unquestionably changing the law” (p. 32). The
study of fair use commissioned by Congress
as background for its deliberations leading up
to the 1976 Act found not a single case where
such making of multiple copies for their own
sake constituted fair use.
It is Congress’s prerogative to decide what
activities should be regarded as legal if they benefit the public sufficiently, and in this instance
its preference (as influenced by heavy lobbying
from the educational sector) was made clear
thenceforth. But it is important to realize how
radical a departure this was from the previous
judicial history of fair use, and it remains to be
seen how much the judiciary will itself sanction
this departure from settled legal precedent. In
one notable instance, it did not. Judge Newman, writing for the majority in the Texaco decision, declared: “We would seriously question
whether the fair use analysis that has developed
with respect to works of authorship alleged to
use portions of copyrighted material is precisely
applicable to copies produced by mechanical
means. The traditional fair use analysis, now
codified in section 107, developed in an effort
to adjust the competing interests of the authors
— the author of the original copyrighted work
and the author of the secondary work that ‘copies’ a portion of the original work in the course
of producing what is claimed to be a new work.
Mechanical ‘copying’ of an entire document,
made readily feasible by the advent of xerography is obviously an activity entirely different
from creating a work of authorship. Whatever
social utility copying of this sort achieves, it is
not concerned with creative authorship (italics
added).” Please note that this decision was
made by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
and therefore exists as binding precedent for
this Circuit.
It is easy to infer from this decision that the
Second Circuit holds a much different view of
what may be considered “transformative” than
the Ninth Circuit does. The functional utility
of Google indexing and searching is much more
akin to the “social utility” of photocopying than
it is to the paradigmatic kind of transformation
by way of value added that goes on when one

writer or scholar builds creatively upon the
work of another. Judge Newman clearly saw
the difference. Band, however, does not. The
advice he gives therefore needs to be taken with
great caution. The general conclusion that he
draws from the three cases he analyzes is that
“repurposing” alone suffices to ground a claim
of fair use because of its social utility. Thus he
thinks it reasonable for an educational institution to assume that “an educational use of an
entertainment product is transformative because
the work is being repurposed….[and, when a
teacher reproduces a poem, a sound recording,
or a photograph so that his students can study the
work, his use is transformative” — as though,
magically, merely making copies available to
students somehow adds value to them because
of the new context of their use. He further
suggests that “tools like Blackboard permit an
instructor to create an online anthology for a
class, including copyrighted works, commentary, lecture notes, and student reactions” and
“this recontextualization appears to provide a
stronger fair use defense than would a libraryrun e-reserves containing just the plain text of
works.” This theory would also presumably
sanction publishing such an anthology online
through the library or an institutional repository,
eliminating the need for any permissioning of
the copyrighted contents. Band does admit
that “the repurposing argument provides less
protection with respect to works that target
the education market,” but he goes on to distinguish in this respect textbooks from journal
articles and academic books. Journal articles,
he asserts, have scholars as their primary audience and “because undergraduates are not the
target audience of journal articles, inclusion of
such articles in e-reserves or a course Website
might well be treated as a form of repurposing.”
Academic books, he believes, fall in a middle
ground, “but even if the book is aimed to some
extent at the student market, a course Website
could recontextualize the book.”
To his credit, Band recognizes that “without
doubt, many copyright owners will not agree
with this analysis of the possible implications
of the three decisions.” I am not a copyright
owner, but I do head a university press that
publishes scholarly books and journals whose
copyright is owned by Penn State University.
In that capacity I have a fiduciary responsibility
to manage the university’s copyrights in the
best interests of the university, which I interpret to mean that we should challenge uses of
our works that do not add value to them in the
usual way understood in fair-use jurisprudence
but merely reproduce more copies for the
educational market, which is the principal (and
often the only) market for our publications. By
blurring the distinction between what I have
elsewhere dubbed as “creative” and “quantitative” uses, Band offers advice to universities
that may get them in trouble. My difference
with Band, in a sense, comes down to a bet:
will the Second Circuit’s traditionalist interpretation of what “transformative” means ultimately prevail over the Ninth Circuit’s when
a case involving sheer duplication reaches the
Supreme Court? Given how the Supreme
Court has already reacted to Ninth Circuit
decisionmaking in the Grokster case, I think I
have the safer bet.
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